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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CAS.E 
Insofar as this appe!al is concerned, this is an action 
on a written contract to recover the sum of $1,000 which 
the plaintiff claims is due under the contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From a judgment 
for the plaintiff, defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and 
judgment in its favor of no cause of action with respect 
to the $1,000. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
:MARIAN CORNWALL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
vVILLOW CREEK COUNTRY 
CLUB, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATIEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 9568 
This case involve1s an action to recover the sum 
of $1,000.00 under paragraph six of a written contract 
entered into between plaintiff and defendant. Miss Corn-
wall, the plaintiff in this action, is an interior decorator. 
Willow Creek ·Country Club, the defendant, is a Utah 
non-profit corporation recently organi~ed and operat-
ing as a golf and country club. The parties entered 
into a written agreement dated September 22, 1959 
(Exh. P-1) in which the plaintiff agreed to furnish her 
services to the Club as an interior decorator for the 
interior decoration of defendant's new clubhouse. The 
contract provid€s in paragraph two that the decorator 
shall prepare a master plan for the interior decoration 
of the entire clubhouse and further prepare such detailed 
plans, sketches, color charts and other materials as shall 
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be reasonably necessary to imple1nent the master plan, 
and also to specify colors, paints, fixtures and other 
materials to he used in the decoration of the clubhouse. 
(Exh. P-1, paragraph 2). At the time the contract was 
entered into the clubhouse was in the process of being 
constructed. (R. 21) 
It was kno·wn by both parties at the time the con-
tract was entered into that the Club did not have suf-
ficient fund's to complete the interior decoration, (R. 34, 
36, 80) and plaintiff had' been instructed by letter, (Exh. 
D-7) written by Mr. Safford, chairman of the Building 
Committee to the plaintiff prior to the actual execution 
of the written c.ontract that her purchase plan would 
take into account the acquisition of furnishings in a 
manner so as to make the Club operative, if not com-
plete, with the initial expenditures. 
"It must be understood as part of this agree-
ment that you are to develop a master plan for 
decorating the -entire premises in a complete and 
functional manner even though it is recognized 
that we probably cannot buy all furnishings and 
accessories at this time to complete your accept-
able plans. It is further understood that your 
purchase plan will take into account the acquisi-
tion of such furnishings in a manner so as to 
make our Club operative, if not complete, with 
the initial ,expenditures." (Exh. D-7) 
Plaintiff admits that at the time the contract was dis-
cussed and entered into she knew that the Club did 
not have sufficient funds to complete the schedules she 
set up for interior decorating. 
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Q. ''Now, at the tirne you discussed this con-
tract or entered into the contract vou were ad-
vised were you not that the Club did not have 
sufficrent funds to complete these schedules which 
you have produced here and which are introduced 
into evidence as exhibits. 
A. "Yes." (R. 34) 
It was because of the fact that the Club did not have 
sufficient funds to complete the interior decorating that 
the provisions set forth in paragraph six were incorp-
orated into the contract. This is corroborated by both 
plaintiff and defendant. Mr. Safford, chairman of the 
Building Committee, testified as follows concerning this 
paragraph in the contract in answer to questions by 
defendant's counsel: 
Q. "Now, I notice· on those letters (Exh. D-12 
and D-7) neither of them contains any provision 
with respect to any penalty clause or payment 
for $1,000 in the event the contract is not renewed. 
A. Well, the discussion regarding the pen-
alty clause, of course, carne up after the letters 
because it hadn't been brought up to that point. 
Q. And would' you state whether or not you 
had a conversation with ::Miss Cornwall about that. 
.l\.. Yes, a number of different conversations. 
Q. And will you state, if you can, the ap-
proximate time of those conversations and in 
general what was S'aid by you and what was said 
by her. 
A. Well, the times of the conversations were 
between the time the letters were written and the 
actual contract was entered into * * * * 
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Q. Now, what was the substance of the con-
versation with respect to the penalty provision. 
A. Well, there were very few points of dif-
ference between what we want;ed to accomplish. 
We were simply trying to reduce to writing that 
which we pretty much had agreed upon. A prob-
lem had arisen and it is the reason to the best 
of my knowledge for the penalty provision in 
the contract. The problem was that we did not 
have enough money, which I had told' l\1iss Corn-
wall, to complete what I as chairman of the Build-
ing Committee, and the Building Committee, and 
the Board had envisioned as proper furnishings 
for the Club. It was physically impossible. As 
I recall, there was only $25,000 available at that 
time which had to include the kitchen. It was 
either $25,000 or $40,000-either one of them-
which would' have been impossible to con1plete 
the furnishings and, therefore, a problem as far 
as she was concerned, and also a problem as 
far .as we were eoncerned was making sure that 
the tenure of her contract would be long enough 
to carry out the master plan which our contract 
called for. Our contract specified, and it was a 
prime point, that it include a master plan that 
could be followed' through because at that time 
we didn't anticipate being able to complete it. 
In fact, we knew we couldn't unless something was 
done. So our problem was to devise some means 
that would assure the Club and also ~fiss Cornwall 
of being able to complete the job, whatever she 
came up with in the way of specifications. There-
fore, she wanted a penalty clause, and I was very 
much in favor of it and' recommended it and got 
the. approval of the Board of having the penalty 
clause in the contract. 
Q. Was it discussed as a penalty provision 1 
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A. The \vord ''penalty" was used and it was 
put in there for a specific purpose which Miss 
Cornwall and I discussed on several different 
occasion~, the purpose of it being to make sure 
that the contract was completed. I insisted with 
the Board of Directors that some provision be 
made so that 1fiss Cornwall could be retained 
through the entire job so that there would be no 
changing of horses in the middle of the stream. 
Changing decorators in the middle of a job, if 
you have any familiarity with decorating, is ridic-
ulous and could have resulted in a substantial 
additional expenditure to the Club.'' (R. 80-83) 
When _Miss Corn-wall was asked on cross examina-
tion about this provision she testified as follows: 
Q. "1fiss Cornwall, will you state the dis-
cussion you had concerning the provision put 
in the contract pertaining to this $1,000 penalty. 
A. VVhen I met with N orval Safford in dis-
cussion pertaining to the contract, the $1,000 
clause was put in to assure me of adequate com-
pensation for doing this particular project. The 
percentage that I had agreed upon to work on 
was quite a low one and there were other nebulous 
things; there were various uncertainties at that 
time. For example, one of the most important 
discussions in connection with this had to do with 
the change of officers or any change that might 
influence the working relationship that we had. 
And so this particular device was used, as I say, 
to assure me of adequate compensation. 
Q. Now, that was in the event that they 
terminated your service by virtue of putting in 
a new Board of Directors to insure that you were 
able to complete the work. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And that was the primary discussion 
that brought the thing about, was it. That actually 
it would be for the benefit of both; that the 
Board that was in there at that time wanted to 
see you complete the project and then you were 
interested in not having your services terminated 
prior to the completion of the plan that you were 
anticipating preparing. Is that it 1 
A. The interest was mainly in the working 
relationship of the people with whom you are 
dealing. An established pattern is developed with 
one group of people that you are working with 
that may not follow through the same way, but 
I wouldn't say that it was the biggest considera-
tion. As I mentioned before, adequate compensa-
tion was a consideration because of the percent-
age figure mentioned." (R. 50, 51) 
The plaintiff prepared a master plan for the interior 
decoration of the entire clubhouse, (Exh. D-5) and coJor 
ciharts, decoration schedules and furnishing and place-
ment lists (Exh. D-6). The master plan was an outline 
of e:verything that plaintiff was to do inside the build-
ing. (R. 28) All the work outlined in the master plan 
and schedules as -well as outside work around the patios 
and pool area subsequently outlined and agreed upon 
between the parties was complet·ed prior to the expira-
tion of the contract. (R. 32, 34) In order to complete 
the program of furnishing the clubhouse and other 
proj~ects the club n1mnbers were assessed $350.00 each 
enabling . the Club to co1nplete all interior decorating 
within the one-year term of the contract. (R. 36, 38, 40) 
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Under the provisions of paragraph three of the 
contract (I~xh. P-1) the Club agreed to pay a fee to 
the decorator of six per cent o.f the Club's purchase 
price of all furnishings purchased by the Club during 
the term of the agree1nent. At the time plaintiff filed 
her action defendant acknowledged there was approx-
imately $200 to $300 still owing to plaintiff under the 
tenns of the agrBement, but denied that it owed to 
plaintiff the sum of $1,000 claimed by the plaintiff under 
paragraph six of the contract. 
Paragraphs five and six of the contract provide as 
follows: 
5. "The decorator is guaranteed a minimum 
fee of Fifteen Hundred ($1,500) Dollars. In the 
event that purchases of furnishings by the Club 
shall not be sufficient in amount as to permit 
the decorator a Fifteen Hundred ($1,500) Dollar 
fee, on the basis of six ( 6%) per cent of the price 
of the furnishings purchased by the Club during 
the term of the agreement, the difference between 
the amount the decorator has been paid and Fif-
teen Hundred ( $1,500) Dollars shall he paid to 
decorator within thirty (30) days after the expira-
tion of this contract." 
6. "This contract shall be for a term of one 
(1) year from the date hereof, and may be re-
newed by the Club upon the same terms, for an 
additional one (1) year, by giving written notice 
of renewal to the decorator at least thirty (30) 
days prior to the date of expiration. In the event 
that the contract is not renewed, the Club shall 
pay the decorator an additional fee of One Thous-
and ( $1,000) Dollars." 
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The trial court found that after the date of the 
contract on September 22, 1959 there became due and 
owing to plaintiff from the defendant on account for 
S'ervices, merchandise and sales tax (stipulated at $50) 
(R. 18) the sum of $7,577.41, and that defendant had 
paid to plaintiff the sum of $7,293.59, leaving a balance 
of $283.82. (In excess of $4,000 was fee.) Court further 
found that defendant owed to plaintiff the sum of $1,000 
under paragraph six of the contract because defendant 
failed to renew the contract. This award of $1,000 is 
the only point involved in the appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
The trial court erred in its interpretation of the 
contract when it awarded the sum of $1,000 to the 
plaintiff for defendant's failure to renew the contract. 
In construing a contract the true object is to arrive 
at the intention of the parties, to he ascertained by 
considering the object and purpose of the parties in 
making the agreement. Anderson vs. Great E.aste,rn 
Casualty Company (51 Utah 78, 168 P. 966). 
An agreement should be integrated as a whole and 
the meaning gathered from the entire context and not 
from particular words, phrases or clauses. In fact, the 
entire agreement is to be considered to determine the 
meaning of each part. All provisions of it, if possible, 
should be so interpreted as to harmonize with each other. 
Where a contract a.s a whole discloses a given inten-
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tion and certain words or clauses would, if taken literally, 
defeat the intention they will be interpreted, if possible, 
so as to be consistent with the general intent. Vitograph, 
Inc. vs. American Theatres Company, (77 Utah 71, 291 
P. 303, 12 Am. Jur. Section 241, pages 773-774). 
Under paragraph two of the contract the decorator 
1s required to prepare a master plan for the interior 
decoration of the entire clubhouse (Exh. P-1). Basically, 
the sole object of the contract was the complete decora-
tion of the clubhouse. The decoration of the outside 
patios and the pool area was also included. When both 
of these jobs were done, and both were done within the 
yearly tenn of the contract, (R. 32, 34) the work of the 
interior decorator was finished. 
The only intent to he derived from reading the con-
tract is that the parties entered into a contract for 
the completion of the interior decorating of the club-
house. The defendant contends that this work, having 
been completed, there was no contract to be renewed; 
that in view of the fact that the parties were contract-
ing for the particular work to be done and that it had 
been done, the contract was terminated. The contract 
has to be interpreted in the light of the circumstances 
under which it was made, and the ·Court may take into 
consideration the conferences and correspondence be-
tween the parties pending the negotiations of the agree-
ment. (12 Am. Jur. Section 234, page 758.) When the 
circumstances and the correspondence and preliminary 
negotiations pending this agreement are considered one 
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comes to the obvious conclusion that lack of funds and 
a desire to continue the services of the decorator until 
her plan for decorating was completed led to the inser-
tion of paragraph six into the contract. 
The contract was incomplete in that it did not have 
a provision in it with respect to the termination to be 
effected by completion of the object of the contract. 
F'or that matter, it was incomplete in other particulars 
in that it failed to mention the decoration contemplated 
of the patios and pool areas unless it be assumed that 
the term interior decoration includes these areas. Under 
these circumstances courts have allowed evidence to be 
introduced to show the understanding of the parties and 
their intention with respect to the incomplete provisions. 
Thus in the case of Spitz vs. Brickhouse, (1954, Ill. 124. 
N. E. (2) 117, 49 ALR (2) 675) the parties executed 
a standard American Institute of Architects form con-
tract ( A.I.A. providing that the architect was to receive 
fees at the basic rate of ten per cent of the ''cost of 
the work,'' defining the ''cost of the work" as the cost 
to the owner exclusive of architect fees and providing 
for preliminary payments of various percentages of the 
basic rate computed upon a "reasonable estimated cost.'' 
The court held the agreement was ambiguous and in-
complete in that it was silent as to the size, style and 
quality of the house and that it would be unreasonable 
to suppose that the owner entered into a contract which 
would bind him to accept a house at any cost which the 
architect might design especially in view of the provision 
for payment cmnputed on a "reasonable estimated co.st." 
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The court, therefore, allowed parol evidence to be intro-
duced to determine the intention of the parties and a 
parol agremnent that the cost of the house would not 
exceed $25,000. 
The agreement 1n the case before this court is 
an1biguous and incomplete. It sets out the work that 
is to be done-complete interior decoration- and also 
provides for a fee on the basis of a percentage of the 
purchase cost of the interior decorations with a minimurn 
provided in the event the fee does not amount to $1,500, 
and further provides for a penalty fee in the event the 
contract is not renewed. It does not mention termina-
tion by completion of the performance of the work that 
is to be done and it is ambiguous and incomplete in 
this respect. It would be unreasonable to suppose that 
the defendant in this case would enter into a contract 
for a penalty provision for the defendant''s failure to 
renew a contract which was completed. If defendant 
renewed the contract it would have to pay a minimum 
fee of $1,500 when there were no purchases to be made, 
and if it didn't renew defendant would pay a penalty 
of $1,000 when there was nothing further to be done. 
Certainly this is ambiguous and the contract must be 
interpreted that if there was work yet to be done by 
the decorator for which a fee would be payable and 
defendant failed to renew the contract the defendant 
would pay to the plaintiff the sum of $1,000 for its 
failure to renew the contract. In 12 Am. J ur. Page 275 
the rule is set forth which we think applies to this 
provision of the contract : 
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''Whatever is necessarily implied in a con-
tract is as much a part thereof as if expressly 
stated therein, but the implication must result 
from the language employed in the instrument 
or be indispensable to carry the .intention of the 
parties into effect." (Italics ours.) 
Paragraph six of the contract should be interpreted 
to read in the following manner: 
This contract shall be for a term of one year 
from the date hereof and may be renewed by the 
Club upon the same terms for an additional one 
year by giving a written notice of renewal to the 
decorator at least thirty days prior to the date 
of expiration. In the event that the contract is not 
renewed and there is work yet to be d-one by the 
decorator for which a fee would be payable, the 
Club shall pay the decorator an additional fee of 
$1,000. (Italics ours). 
In the case of Loyal Order of Moose vs. Faulhaber, 
327 Mich. 244, 1950, 41 N. W. (2) 535, the standard 
A.I.A. form contract was held not to be free from 
ambiguities, so that it was proper to show by parol 
testimony the actual situation that existed to the knowl-
edge of the architect as well as the owner. The court 
held that upon evidence that the architect was informed 
before ·entering into the contract that the owner did 
not have the necessary funds to carry out the work he, 
therefore, must 'have known that the undertaking was 
uncertain and contingent and so was not entitled to 
recover where the owner was unable to raise funds to 
carry out the work on the scale planned by the architect 
and finally did the work according to other plans. 
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Our case is different somewhat from this but the 
principle upon which the case was decided is applicable 
to our case. The decision was based upon the under-
standing of the parties as it must have been in view 
of the known existing conditions at the time the· contract 
wa~ entered into. In the case of Miss Cornwall vs. Wil-
low Creek Country Club both parties realized and knew 
that there were insufficient funds available to com-
plete the decorator's plans for the interior decoration 
and paragraph SL"'{ of the: contract was inser•ted with 
this thought in mind. Adequate provisions were put 
into the agreement to protect the decorator in her fee 
because the Club didn't hav-e sufficient funds available 
at the time to perform the work at once. She admits 
that she knew this fact and she states that the: provision 
was put in the agreen1ent to assure that she received 
adequate compensation in the event there was a change 
in the Board of Directors which might have some idea 
of changing decorating plans. (R 15, 51) It would be 
an injustice to allow her to reeover $1,000 under these 
circumstances where the total work to be done had been 
completed before the time for the renewal arrived. 
~either party had anticipated any additional fee other 
than the six per eent of purchase with a $1,500 minimum 
as is evidenced by their letters written prior to the 
execution of the contract, (Exh. D7 and Dl2) and it is 
clear from the evidence on both sides that the purpose 
of paragraph six in the contract was to insure the com-
pletion of the contract by the plaintiff and the defendant. 
Having con1pleted the contract in full and finished all 
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planned decorating inside and out, plaintiff was not 
entitled to a penalty fee for defendant's failure to renew 
the contract. Plaintiff had received all the compensa-
tion contemplated by the parties for full performance 
of it. Plaintiff claims there were some additional things 
to be done and cites in support thereof a letter written 
on the 12th of July, 1960 (Exh. P-9) in which plaintiff 
sets forth certain observations concerning the operation 
of the Club after the decorating had been completed. 
A reading of this letter indicates that it was written 
in response to complaints on the part of members or 
officers of the Club which, in fact, were the basis of 
the defendant's counter claim in this action and that 
it did not call for or suggest any additional work on 
the part of the plaintiff for whicJh an additional fee 
would be owing, nor was irt a part of the master plan 
that was originally prepared by the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that a fair analysis of 
this written contract as a whole considered in the light 
of the existing circumstances at the time it was entered 
into clearly establishes that the true intention of the 
parties at the time the contract was executed was that 
the $1,000 provided for in paragraph six in the event 
the d!efendarut failed to renew the contract would be 
payable only in the event that there ·was additional 
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work to be done by the decorator under the contract 
for which a fee was payable, and the Club failed to 
renew it. Since the evidence is clear that the work had 
all been completed under the contract the trial court's 
judgment should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAvVRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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